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Abstract
We study foreign direct investment agreements that entitle firms to a lower tax
rate during a tax holiday period. Our model considers both finite and uncertain
tax holiday period settings. We show that the tax holiday duration may have, for
small tax rate reductions, a nonmonotonic effect on the investment timing. For
sufficiently high tax reductions, a longer tax holiday speeds up investment. A
higher tax reduction during the tax holiday and a lower uncertainty are shown
to have a monotonic effect on the threshold, hastening investment. However, in
case of a finite tax holiday, for exceptional high salvage values, a higher uncer-
tainty can speed up investment. We show the usefulness of our model to design
an optimal incentives package that prompts investment.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Governments use corporate tax incentives to enhance for-
eign direct investment (FDI). The offer to a foreign firm of
a more attractive tax rate is often enough to make an invest-
ment profitable, or the relocation of a business to another
country optimal. For instance, amongst the EU countries,
Ireland is well known for its aggressive corporate tax pol-
icy, which attracts FDI.
An FDI agreement can be seen as a contract between
a country and a foreign firm through which, over a
given time period, the two parties are entitled to a set
of financial benefits and obligations. The benefits for the
firm are usually given through subsidies, guarantees, or
lower tax rates, whereas the obligations are normally
required through the promotion of new jobs, investment
in human capital, establishment of business partnerships
with local firms, or, as we will consider, the commitment
to remain in the country, not divesting during a given time
period.
We develop a real options model that determines the
optimal time to undertake an FDI when there is a tax
holiday period over which the firm agrees not to divest.
This means that, after investing, instead of the (usual)
divestment option, the firm holds a forward start option
to abandon the investment, which can only be exercised
after the expiration date of the FDI agreement. By consid-
ering this constrain on the divestment option, we depart
from the previous literature. We believe that this is a
realistic setting, because it is not plausible that a coun-
try offers a tax holiday to a foreign firm without any
constrain.
Our model considers two settings: a finite and a random
duration of the tax holiday period. In the former case, the
firm is offered a tax reduction lasting for a certain period
of time, whereas in the latter, the tax reduction is offered
as permanent but is perceived as reversible by the firm, as
a result of a tax policy change.
Typically, FDI agreements hold during relatively long
time periods, over which investments can face very adverse
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economic conditions, where a change in the tax rate,
a size contraction, or an early abandonment may have
to be considered.1 Although the abandonment of FDI
projects before the agreed termination date is not very fre-
quent, it often happens, due to political disputes between
countries, or the bankruptcy or financial distress of the
parent firm.
The main results of this paper can be summarized as
follows. For both the finite and random cases, the tax
holiday duration may have, for small tax rate reductions,
a nonmonotonic effect on the investment timing. This
is because of the trade-off between the gains from the
tax reduction and the loss in divesting flexibility dur-
ing the tax holiday period. For a sufficiently high tax
reduction, a longer tax holiday hastens investment. How-
ever, despite of this trade-off, we show that a higher tax
reduction has a monotonic effect on the threshold, speed-
ing up investment. We also show that for most cases,
the effect of uncertainty is to deter investment. How-
ever, in case of a finite tax holiday, a higher uncertainty
can speed up investment for exceptional high salvage
values.
The effect of taxation policy on investment decisions
under uncertainty has been a relevant research topic in
accounting and finance. Most of the available theoret-
ical results are based on model settings where market
uncertainty is taken into account, the investment cost
is irreversible and fixed, the tax and the fiscal depre-
ciation rates are both known (e.g., Agliardi, 2001; Bar-
bosa, Carvalho, & Pereira, 2016; Gries, Prior, & Sureth,
2012; MacKie-Mason, 1990; Niemann & Sureth, 2004,
2013; Pennings, 2000; Sureth, 2002; Tian, 2018; Wong,
2009; Yu, Chang, & Fan, 2007). Nevertheless, these mod-
els make the assumption that there is not taxation policy
uncertainty.
The theoretical literature which considers both mar-
ket and taxation policy uncertainty is still very lim-
ited. The works of Hassett and Metcalf (1999) and
Niemann (2004) are amongst the few exceptions. Specifi-
cally, Hassett and Metcalf (1999) study the effect of taxa-
tion policy uncertainty (i.e., changes in the investment tax
credits can occur in the near future due to a random dis-
crete jump) and show that the gains from delaying the
investment is negatively affected by the likelihood of an
unfavourable tax switch. Niemann (2004) investigates the
effect of the tax rate uncertainty on the timing of the
investment and conclude that a rise of the tax rate uncer-
tainty has an inconclusive effect on the timing of the
investment.
Alvarez, Kanniainen, and Södersten (1998) consider tax-
ation policy uncertainty but neglect market uncertainty.
He examines the effect of the timing and the nature of a
corporate tax reform uncertainty on investment decisions
and shows that the expectation of a reduction in the corpo-
rate tax rate enhances investment, whereas the expectation
of a contraction in the tax base (i.e., the fiscal depreciation
rate) deters investment.
Very few works study the effect on investment deci-
sions of both market uncertainty and taxation policy
together with the divestment option. The few excep-
tions are Agliardi (2001), Wong (2009), and Niemann
and Sureth (2013). Agliardi (2001) studies the effect on
the timing of the investment of the taxation policy and
the uncertainty about both the operating income and the
replacement value of the firm's capital and concludes that
fiscal policies can have an ambiguous effect on invest-
ment timing. Wong (2009) considers progressive taxa-
tion and concludes that the threshold to abandon the
investment decreases with the tax exemption threshold
and increases with the tax rate. Niemann and Sureth
(2013) investigate the effect of the capital gains tax rate
on the entry and exit timing of depreciable investment
projects. Their results show that a higher tax rate does
not necessarily delay investment if salvage values are
relatively high.
Our model departs from these models by consider-
ing the divestment flexibility under a tax policy which
includes tax holidays incentives. Jou (2000) model has
some similarities with ours in the sense that both study
the optimal investment timing considering market uncer-
tainty and tax holidays. However, instead of the divest-
ment option constrained by the FDI the agreement, he
only considers a temporary unconstrained suspension. In
addition, he considers a full tax exemption and neglects
tax policy uncertainty, whereas our model accounts
for different levels of tax reductions as well as policy
uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the base model for the finite tax holiday incen-
tive which constrains the divestment flexibility. Section 3
extends the model to the case where there is taxation policy
uncertainty. Section 4 concludes.
2 THE MODEL
Let us suppose that a country and a foreign firm make an
agreement regarding an FDI project, according to which if
the firm undertakes the project, it will be entitled to a more
favourable tax rate over a given time period (T), during
which it cannot divest. Before investing, the firm holds the
option to invest, whose value can be determined follow-
ing standard real option backward induction procedures.
Thus, we start by the derivation of the value function
for the period when the firm is active, and proceed then
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backwards in order to derive the value function for the
period when the firm is inactive.
2.1 The active firm
Let us assume that an all-equity firm is active with an
FDI project that generates a pre-tax profit flow x(t) which
fluctuates over time according to the following geometric
Brownian motion (gBm) process:2
dx(t) = 𝛼x(t)dt + 𝜎x(t)dw(t), x(0) = x, (1)
where 𝛼 < r, 𝜎, and dw are, respectively, the drift under
the risk-neutral measure, the volatility, and the increment
of a Wiener process, and r is the constant risk-free inter-
est rate.
In addition, assume that 𝜏h and 𝜏c are the profit tax
rates which hold, respectively, over and after a tax holiday
period (T), with 0 ≤ 𝜏h < 𝜏c. Therefore, the after-tax
profit flow over the tax holiday period is x(1 − 𝜏h), whereas
the after-tax profit flow for after the tax holiday period is
x(1 − 𝜏c).
Thus, the firm's value is given by the following:













whose solution is the following:
V(x, 𝜏h, 𝜏c,T) =
x
r − 𝛼
(1 − 𝜏(𝜏h, 𝜏c,T)) , (3)
with
𝜏 (𝜏h, 𝜏c,T) = 𝜏h + (𝜏c − 𝜏h)e−(r−𝛼)T , (4)
where T is the tax holiday period, and 𝜏 (𝜏h, 𝜏c,T) is a
time-weighted average tax rate.3
Notice that the FDI contract entitles the firm to a tax
holiday benefit (𝜏c − 𝜏h), over a given time (tax holiday)
period T. In exchange, the firm contractually accepts not
to abandon the investment during that period. The aban-
donment option has value for the firm because it provides
management flexibility if in the future market conditions
deteriorate significantly. Following standard procedures,
the value of the option to abandon (A(x, 𝜏c)) solves the






+ 𝛼x 𝜕A(x, 𝜏c)
𝜕x
− rA(x, 𝜏c) = 0, (5)
and it is given by the following (McDonald & Siegel, 1985;












for x ⩾ xA,
(6)
where S is the project's salvage value, and xA is the optimal























Notice that the firm cannot abandon the investment
whereas the FDI agreement prevails (i.e., during the tax
holiday period, T), but it can do so as soon as it ends. This
means that the FDI agreement comprises a forward aban-
donment option with a starting date on T. Thus, the value
of the active firm is given by the sum of the present value of
the project's future cash flows plus both the present value
of the tax holiday benefits and the value of the forward start
abandonment option.
Proposition 1. The value of an active firm (F(x, .)) that
is under a FDI agreement is given by the following:
F(x, 𝜏h, 𝜏c,T) = V(x, 𝜏h, 𝜏c,T) + FA(x, 𝜏c,T), (9)
where V(x, .) and FA(x, .) represent, respectively, the fir-
m's value, given by Equation 3, and the value of the
forward start option to abandon, which is represented by
the following:














where S is the project's salvage value, xA is the opti-
mal abandonment threshold value, represented by
Equation 7, 𝛽2 is given by Equation 8, N(.) is the cumu-


















d2(x) = d1(x) − 𝜎
√
T, (12)
4 AZEVEDO ET AL.
d3(x) = d1(x) + (𝛽2 − 1) 𝜎
√
T. (13)
The economic interpretation for Equation 10 is as fol-
lows: On the right-hand side, the first two terms represent
the value of the abandonment option at time T, conditional
on the threshold value xA being reached; the third term
represents the value of the abandonment option after T if
x(T) > xA (i.e., if when T is reached the value of the profit
cash flows is above the abandonment threshold value). The
following corollaries also hold:
Corollary 1. When T → 0, firm's value converges to
that of a firm with the abandonment option and that
pays a profit tax rate 𝜏c forever:
lim
T→0
F(x, 𝜏h, 𝜏c,T) =
x(1 − 𝜏c)
r − 𝛼
+ A(x, 𝜏c). (14)
Corollary 2. When T → ∞, the firm's value converges
to that of a firm without the abandonment option that
pays a profit tax rate 𝜏h forever:
lim
T→∞




2.2 The idle firm
Let us now assume that the firm is currently inactive, wait-
ing for the optimal time to invest. Following a standard real







+ 𝛼x 𝜕O(x, .)
𝜕x
− rO(x, .) = 0. (16)
Using the appropriate boundary conditions, the follow-
ing proposition holds.
Proposition 2. The value of an idle firm (x < xI)
with the above described FDI agreement is given by the
following:






where I is the investment cost, and xI is the optimal
investment threshold value, which can be determined
numerically by solving the following equation:
(𝛽1 − 𝛽2)
(
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For the limiting cases of the tax holiday period (T), the
following corollaries hold:
Corollary 3. When T → 0, the value of the idle firm is
given by the following:
lim
T→0
O(x, 𝜏h, 𝜏c,T) =


















where x∗I is the optimal investment threshold value,
which is a solution of the following equation:
(𝛽1 − 𝛽2)
(





+ (𝛽1 − 1)
x∗I (1 − 𝜏c)
r − 𝛼
− 𝛽1I = 0,
(21)
Corollary 4. When T → ∞, the value of the idle firm is
given by the following:
lim
T→∞
O(x, 𝜏h, 𝜏c,T) =















In addition, the following corollaries also hold:
Corollary 5. The effect on the optimal investment
threshold value (xI) of the tax holiday period (T) is non-
monotonic: 𝜕xI∕𝜕T ≷ 0.
Corollary 6. The optimal investment threshold value
(xI) increases with the tax holiday rate (𝜏h) ∶ 𝜕xI∕𝜕𝜏h
> 0.
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FIGURE 1 The effect of the tax holiday on the investment
threshold (xI). The model parameters are 𝜎 = 0.3, r = 0.05,
𝛼 = 0.02, S = 20, I = 50, and 𝜏c = 0.25
FIGURE 2 The effect of uncertainty (𝜎) on the optimal
investment threshold (xI) for different values of S. The model
parameters are r = 0.05, 𝛼 = 0.02, I = 50, 𝜏h = 0.125, and
𝜏c = 0.25
FIGURE 3 Iso-threshold curves which represent scenarios
where investing is optimal. In this simulation we set x(0) = 7, with
the following model parameters: 𝜎 = 0.3, r = 0.05, 𝛼 = 0.02,
S = 20, I = 50, 𝜏c = 0.25
Corollary 7. The effect on the optimal investment
threshold value (xI) of the market uncertainty (𝜎) is
nonmonotonic: 𝜕xI∕𝜕𝜎 ≷ 0.
Corollary 5 is of particular importance because it asserts
that there are cases where widening the tax holiday period
does not decrease the investment threshold value, speed-
ing up the investment, as we would expect.
Figure 1 illustrates more clearly this important find-
ing: for a relatively low tax holiday benefit (i.e., as 𝜏h
approaches 𝜏c), widening T does not necessarily acceler-
ates investment. On the contrary, it can delay investment if
T is sufficiently high. However, this behaviour is because,
if the tax holiday period rises, it reduces the tax payment,
which enhances investment, but it also constrains the fir-
m's abandonment option for a longer time period, which
precludes investment. These two forces have counteract-
ing effects on the investment threshold, and the effect that
prevails depends on the length of the tax holiday period.
Figure 1 also shows that, when 𝜏h is relatively close to 𝜏c
(i.e., there is a relatively low tax holiday gain), increas-
ing T from zero accelerates investment but only up until
a given T is reached, after which, if T increases, it delays
investment.
Figure 2 shows the effect of uncertainty on the invest-
ment threshold value, for different salvage values. As
expected, a higher salvage value reduces the thresh-
old, hastening the investment. For salvage values below
the investment cost (partial reversibility), the investment
threshold increases with uncertainty (𝜎). Nevertheless, for
the exceptional case where the salvage value is higher than
the investment cost, increasing 𝜎 from zero, delays invest-
ment but only up until a given 𝜎 is reached, after which,
if 𝜎 increases, it accelerates investment, illustrating the
non-monotonic effect shown in Corollary 7. Thus, the rel-
ative value of the salvage value can determine to some
extent the effect of the uncertainty on the timing of the
investment, in particular if the uncertainty is relatively
high. Notice that, although it is not very common to find
projects with salvage values higher that the investment
costs, there are investments where this can happen, for
instance, in real estate investments, or other investments
which comprise assets which are prone to appreciate sig-
nificantly. We note that divestment is only possible after
the tax holiday period, which makes this situation more
plausible.
This result is of some relevance, in particular to those
firms operating in industries with both high future fixed
assets value and high market uncertainty. For instance, a
FDI project which involves the construction of a manufac-
turing plant that is outsourced by the IT industry inherits
both the high uncertainty of the IT sector and the high
fixed assets of the manufacturing industry.
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Figure 3 shows iso-treshold curves for three levels of
uncertainty that represent different (T, 𝜏h) agreements
which trigger investment. A point above the iso-threshold
curves represent scenarios where the country offers the
firm an unnecessary generous tax holiday incentive,
whereas a point below the iso-threshold curves represent
scenarios where tax holiday incentive that is offered to the
firm is not sufficient to trigger investment.
3 TAXATION POLICY
UNCERTAINTY
In the previous section, we assume that a firm and a
country make an FDI agreement according to which, if
the investment is undertaken, the firm will pay a more
favourable a tax rate (𝜏h) over a given time period (T), dur-
ing which it cannot abandon investment. Additionally, we
assume that 𝜏h does not change over time. In this section,
we consider taxation policy uncertainty. Specifically, we
consider the case where the government offers to a firm
a permanent tax rate reduction incentive. Nevertheless, it
makes sense from the firm's perspective to assume that this
tax reduction may not be permanent, as it can be reversed
as a result an unexpected policy change. This tax pol-
icy uncertainty can be modeled as a random event whose
arrival date follows a Poisson jump process with a rate 𝜆.
As before, in exchange for the tax holiday, the firm accepts
not to divest.
The case of Ireland is perhaps a good illustrative example
of the application of this model setting. Currently, Ireland
offers a much more attractive corporate tax rate to some
firms (for instance, Apple). But as the recent 2008-2009
financial crisis has shown, from the firm's perspective,
when evaluating an FDI project that requires a long-term
nonabandonment commitment, it may make sense to
assume that the taxation policy that is offered today may
not hold all over the life-time of the investment.
We start by the derivation of the value function for
when the firm is active and proceed then backwards in
order to derive the value function for when the firm
is inactive.
3.1 The active firm
Under this setting, the active firm benefiting from a reduce
tax rate 𝜏h faces the risk of a sudden tax policy change,
where the tax is reversed to the normal tax rate 𝜏c. This
event is modeled to arrive according to a Poisson jump
with intensity 𝜆. The value of an active firm (VR(x, .)) must






+ 𝛼x 𝜕VR(x, .)
𝜕x
− rVR(x, .) + x(1 − 𝜏h)
+ 𝜆 [G(x, 𝜏c) − VR(x, .)] = 0,
(24)
where G(x, 𝜏c) is the firm's value after a rise of the tax rate




+ A(x, 𝜏c). (25)
The last term of the left-hand side of the equation repre-
sents the expected value loss due to the possibility of a rise
of the tax rate in the next instant.
Proposition 3. The value of an active firm paying cur-
rently a tax rate 𝜏h which can increase to 𝜏c at a random
future date is given by the following:
VR(x, 𝜏h, 𝜏c, 𝜆) =
x(1 − 𝜏h)
r − 𝛼 + 𝜆
+
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩












for x ⩾ xA,
(26)
where xA is the optimal abandonment threshold value,






























































+ 2(r + 𝜆)
𝜎2
< 0. (30)
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For the limiting cases of 𝜆, the following corollaries hold:
Corollary 8. When 𝜆 → ∞ (i.e., a change in the tax
rate is certain) the firm's value converges to that of a
firm which holds an abandonment option and profits
are taxed at 𝜏c:
lim
𝜆→∞
VR(x, 𝜏h, 𝜏c, 𝜆) =
x(1 − 𝜏c)
r − 𝛼
+ A(x, 𝜏c). (31)
Corollary 9. When 𝜆 → 0 (i.e., a change in the tax rate
will not happen) the firm's value converges to that of a
firm which does not hold an abandonment option and
profits are taxed at 𝜏h:
lim
𝜆→0




3.2 The idle firm
While waiting to invest, the firm holds an option to under-
take the project by paying an investment cost K. The value






+ 𝛼x 𝜕OR(x, .)
𝜕x
− rOR(x, .) = 0. (33)
Using the appropriate boundary conditions, the follow-
ing proposition holds.
Proposition 4. The value of the option to invest in a
project which benefits from a favorable tax rate 𝜏h that
can reversed to 𝜏c at a random future date is given by the
following:






where xR is the investment threshold value, which is the
solution of the following equation:
(𝛽1 − 𝜂2)b4x
𝜂2
R + (𝛽1 − 1)
(
xR(1 − 𝜏h)
r − 𝛼 + 𝜆
+ 𝜆




− 𝛽1I = 0,
(35)
For the limiting cases of 𝜆, the following corollaries hold:
Corollary 10. When 𝜆 → ∞ (i.e., a change in the tax























where x∗R is the optimal investment threshold, which is a
solution for the following equation:
(𝛽1 − 𝛽2)
(





+ (𝛽1 − 1)
x∗R(1 − 𝜏c)
r − 𝛼
− 𝛽1I = 0.
(37)
Corollary 11. When 𝜆 → 0 (i.e., a change in the tax




OR(x, 𝜏h, 𝜏c, 𝜆) =
















Below are some corollaries that summarize our findings
regarding the effect of the market uncertainty and the tax-
ation policy uncertainty on the timing of the investment.
Corollary 12. The effect of the taxation policy uncer-
tainty (𝜆) on the optimal investment threshold (xR) is
nonmonotonic: 𝜕xR∕𝜕𝜆 ≷ 0.
FIGURE 4 The effect of the taxation policy uncertainty (𝜆) on
the optimal investment threshold (xR), for different tax holiday rates
(𝜏h). The model parameters are 𝜎 = 0.3, r = 0.05, 𝛼 = 0.02,
S = 20, I = 50, 𝜏c = 0.25
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FIGURE 5 Iso-threshold curves, for different values of uncertainty (𝜎) ∶ (𝜆, 𝜏h) pair values that trigger immediate investment. We use
x(0) = 7 and the following model parameters: r = 0.05, 𝛼 = 0.02, S = 20, I = 50, 𝜏c = 0.25
Corollary 13. The investment threshold (xR) increases
with the tax holiday rate (𝜏h) ∶ 𝜕xR∕𝜕𝜏h > 0.
Corollary 14. The investment threshold (xR) increases
with the uncertainty (𝜎) ∶ 𝜕xR∕𝜕𝜎 > 0.
Corollary 12 is important, because it asserts that there
are market conditions in which a rise of the taxation
policy uncertainty does not discourage investment. This
is because, for a relatively low tax holiday benefit (i.e.,
when 𝜏h is relatively close to 𝜏c) the losses from a rise
of the tax rate are more limited. Thus, if the likelihood
of a rise of tax rate increases, the value loss, due to the
increase in the expected tax payment, can more easily
be offset by the value gain from the elimination of the
nonabandonment option constrain. These two forces have
counteracting effects on the investment threshold. The
force which prevails over time depends on the terms of the
FDI agreement and the market conditions.
Figure 4 illustrates more clearly how the above described
forces interact with the investment threshold. For a rel-
atively high tax holiday benefits (i.e., when 𝜏h is signifi-
cantly lower than 𝜏c), the investment threshold increases
with 𝜆. However, if the tax holiday benefit is very small
(i.e. 𝜏h is very close to 𝜏c), a rise of the taxation policy
uncertainty leads to a decreases of the investment thresh-
old. For intermediate tax holiday benefits, the relationship
between 𝜆 and xR tends to be nonmonotonic, being the
sensitivity of xR to changes in 𝜆 more acute when the tax-
ation policy uncertainty is low and the tax holiday benefit
is small.
Figure 5 shows iso-treshold curves that represent pairs of
𝜆 and 𝜏h, which trigger investment, for different levels of 𝜎.
Points above or below these curves represent, respectively,
scenarios where the investment incentive is unnecessary
generous or not sufficient to trigger investment. For rela-
tively low value of 𝜆 and relatively high values 𝜎 a rise of 𝜆
does not necessarily delays investment.
4 CONCLUSION
This paper studies optimal FDI tax holiday incentive pack-
ages considering market and taxation policy uncertainty.
In exchange for the tax benefit, the firm agrees not to divest
during the tax holiday period. We derive a real options
investment model considering two settings. One where the
tax holiday period is finite and certain and another where
a firm is offered a permanent tax reduction, which is per-
ceived as reversible, due to a tax policy change, resulting
in a random tax holiday duration.
We show that, for both the finite and random cases, the
tax holiday duration may have, for small tax rate reduc-
tions, a nonmonotonic effect on the investment timing. In
fact, the benefit of a longer tax holiday period may not
compensate to forgo the flexibility of divesting when mar-
ket conditions deteriorate. For sufficient tax reductions the
expected effect holds, that is, a longer tax holiday speeds
up investment.
However, despite of this trade-off between the lost flex-
ibility and the tax benefit, a higher tax reduction during
the tax holiday is shown to have a monotonic effect on the
threshold, hastening investment.
Finally, for the common reversibility situations, the
effect of uncertainty on the investment threshold is in line
with the previous literature, where a higher uncertainty
deters investment. However, in case of a finite tax holiday,
we show that for exceptional high salvage values, a higher
uncertainty can speed up investment.
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Our model can be extended in several ways, for instance,
by considering competition amongst firms and/or amongst
FDI host countries, possibly, relying on Smets (1993)
framework. The incorporation in our model of assets
depreciation and/or a more diverse set of taxation policies
which could include tax exemptions, tax credits, or pro-
gressive taxation, would also be a interesting research. Our
model can also be easily adapted to determine a fair reim-
bursement amount that is due to the foreign firm, or the
FDI host country, when there is a breach of the FDI agree-
ment. Finally, the innovative features of our model lead to
interesting results which can be empirical tested in future
research.
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ENDNOTES
1 For instance, the EU countries that were bailed out after the 2008-09 finan-
cial crisis were advised to renegotiate some FDI agreements. Specifically,
Ireland was pressed by France and Germany, during the negotiations of
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. The value of the forward start
option to abandon (FA(.)) is represented by the follow-
ing:
FA(x, 𝜏c,T) = e−rTE [A(x(T), 𝜏c)] , (A1)
where A(x, 𝜏c) is the value of the abandonment option
at time T, given by Equation 6. In addition, A(x, 𝜏c) has
two regions, thus:
FA(x, 𝜏c,T) = e−rTE
[(

















where 1condition is equal to 1 if the condition is met, and
is equal to 0 otherwise.
From Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007), we
acknowledge that the first term of FA(x, 𝜏c,T) repre-
sents the difference between a cash-or-nothing put
option on S, and an asset-or-nothing put option on
x(T)(1 − 𝜏c)∕(r − 𝛼), both with a maturity T and
exercise price xA:
e−rTE [A(x(T), 𝜏c)] 1x(T)<xA = Se
−rTN (−d2(x,T))























d2(x,T) = d1(x,T) − 𝜎
√
T. (A6)
The second term of FA(x, 𝜏c,T) is the following:
e−rTE [A(x(T), 𝜏c)] 1x(T)⩾xA =
(

































Proof of Proposition 2. The value function for an idle







+ 𝛼x 𝜕O(x, .)
𝜕x
− rO(x, .) = 0, (A9)
whose general solution is given by O(x, .) = c1x𝛽1 +
c2x𝛽2 . In addition, limx→0O(x, .) = 0; thus, c2 must be
set equal to 0. Using the following value-matching and
smooth-pasting boundary conditions, we determine
obtain c1 and xI:
c1x
𝛽1







Substituting in the equation system above F(xI, .) by
































The solutions for the above derivatives are provided by
(Shackleton & Wojakowski, 2007, section 4). Substitut-
ing c1x
𝛽1
CA by Equation A12, we obtain the following:
(𝛽1 − 𝛽2)
(





+ (𝛽1 − 1)
x∗I (1 − 𝜏c)
r − 𝛼
− 𝛽1I = 0,
(A13)
where xI is the numerical solution of this equation. The
constant c1 is determined through Equation (A12) and
is given by c1 = (F(xI , .) − I) x
−𝛽1
I .
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Proof of Proposition 3. The value function of an active







+ 𝛼x 𝜕VR(x, .)
𝜕x
− rVR(x, .)
+ x(1 − 𝜏h) + 𝜆 [G(x, 𝜏c) − VR(x, .)] = 0,
(A14)
where G(x, 𝜏c) is the firm's value after a rise of the tax




+ A(x, 𝜏c). (A15)
The last term of the left-hand side of the equation rep-
resents the expected value loss due to the possibility of
a rise of the tax rate in the next instant. The solution to
this ODE corresponds to the sum of the homogeneous









S for x < xA















for x ⩾ xA,
(A16)
where b1, b2, b3, and b4 are arbitrary constants which




























+ 2(r + 𝜆)
𝜎2
< 0, (A18)
Given that limx→0VR(x, .) = 0 and limx→+∞VR(x, .) =
+∞, so the constants b2 and b3 must be set equal to
zero. The first condition ensures that the active firm is
worthless if cash flows drop to zero. For the remain-
ing arbitrary constants we need two additional condi-
tions. However, the two regions of the value function
must met at x = xA, therefore, VR(x, .) is continuous























































r − 𝛼 + 𝜆
𝛽2
𝛽2 − 1

















r − 𝛼 + 𝜆
𝛽2
𝛽2 − 1












Proof of Proposition 4. The value function of the idle






+ 𝛼x 𝜕OR(x, .)
𝜕x
− rOR(x, .) = 0, (A23)
whose general solution is given by OR(x, .) = e1x𝛽1 +
e2x𝛽2 . In addition, limx→0OR(x, .) = 0; therefore, e2 must
be set equal to 0. Using the following value matching
and smooth-pasting boundary conditions, we deter-
mine xI and e1:
e1x
𝛽1







Although VR(x, .)has two branches (see Equation (26)),
we can show that there is not solution for the first
branch, therefore, xR ⩾ xA. Substituting FR(xI, .) by the
second branch of Equation 26, it yields:
(𝛽1 − 𝜂2)b4x
𝜂2
R + (𝛽1 − 1)
(
xR(1 − 𝜏h)
r − 𝛼 + 𝜆
+ 𝜆




− 𝛽1I = 0.
(A26)
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Proof of Corollary 1. If x < xA, limT→0N (d3(x)) = 0,











where this expression corresponds to the lower branch
of Equation 6.
If x ⩾ xA, limT→0N (d3(x)) = 1, limT→0N (−d1(x)) =












where this expression corresponds to the upper branch
of Equation 6.








Proof of Corollary 2. Given that limT→∞N (d3(x)) = 1,
limT→∞e−(r−𝛼)T = 0, and limT→∞e−rT = 0, thus,








Proof of Corollary 3. See Proof of Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 4. See Proof of Corollary 2.
Proof of Corollary 5. Differentiating Equation 18 with











+ 𝛽1 − 1
r − 𝛼
[




= −(𝛽1 − 𝛽2)
(





























where N(.) is the normal density function.
We can show that the cross derivatives of N(.) (i.e.,
𝜕di∕𝜕xI × 𝜕xI∕𝜕T, i ∈ 1, 2, 3) cancel each other out.
Given that N(−d1(x) ⩽ 1, 1 − 𝜏h − (𝜏c − 𝜏h)e−(r−𝛼)T −
(1 − 𝜏c)e−(r−𝛼)TN(−d1(x)) ⩾ (1 − 𝜏h)(1 − e−(r−𝛼)T)) ⩾ 0;
therefore, the coefficient of 𝜕xI∕𝜕T is positive.
However, the sign of the right-hand side of the
equation above is undetermined, thus: 𝜕xI∕𝜕T ≷ 0.
Proof of Corollary 6. Differentiating Equation 18 with
respect to 𝜏h, it yields:
[𝛽2(𝛽1 − 𝛽2)
(







+ 𝛽1 − 1
r − 𝛼
[












In the previous proof, we show that the right hand-side
of the equation and the coefficient of 𝜕xI∕𝜕𝜏h are both
positive; thus, 𝜕xI∕𝜕𝜏h > 0.
Proof of Corollary 7. Differentiating Equation 18 with




+ 𝛽1 − 1
r − 𝛼
[

























































From the previous proofs, we acknowledge that the
coefficient of 𝜕xI∕𝜕𝜎 is positive. In addition, we can
show that 𝜕𝛽1∕𝜕𝜎 < 0, 𝜕𝛽2∕𝜕𝜎 > 0, 𝜕A∕𝜕𝜎 > 0,
𝜕d1(x)∕𝜕𝜎 ≷ 0, 𝜕d2(x)∕𝜕𝜎 < 0, 𝜕d3(x)∕𝜕𝜎 ≷ 0. There-
fore, the sign of the right-hand side of the equation is
undeterminate.
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Proof of Corollary 8. lim𝜆→∞b4 = 0, lim𝜆→∞b1 = 0,
lim𝜆→∞𝜆∕(r + 𝜆) = 1, lim𝜆→∞𝜆∕(r − 𝛼 + 𝜆) = 1.
Thus, the two branches simplify to: x(1 − 𝜏c)∕(r − 𝛼) +
A(x, 𝜏c).
Proof of Corollary 9. lim𝜆→0𝜂1 = 𝛽1, lim𝜆→0𝜂2 = 𝛽2,
lim𝜆→0b1 = 0, lim𝜆→0b4 = S∕(𝛽2 − 1). Thus, the two
branches simplify to: x(1 − 𝜏h)∕r − 𝛼.
Proof of Corollary 10. See Proof of Corollary 8.
Proof of Corollary 11. See Proof of Corollary 9.
Proof of Corollary 12. Differentiating Equation 35




R + (𝛽1 − 1)
(
1 − 𝜏h
r − 𝛼 + 𝜆
+ 𝜆



















+ (𝛽1 − 1)
[
xR
(r − 𝛼 + 𝜆)2
(1 − 𝜏h) −
xR
(r − 𝛼 + 𝜆)2
(1 − 𝜏c)
]
Given that b4 < 0, 𝜂2 < 0, and 𝛽1 > 0, so the coef-
ficient of 𝜕xR∕𝜕𝜆 is positive. However, as 𝜕b4∕𝜕𝜆 > 0
and 𝜕𝜂2∕𝜕𝜆 < 0, the sign of the right-hand side of the
equation is undetermined: 𝜕xR∕𝜕𝜆 ≷ 0.
Proof of Corollary 13. Differentiating Equation 35
with respect to 𝜏h, it yields:[
𝜂2(𝛽1 − 𝜂2)b4x
𝜂2−1
R + (𝛽1 − 1)
(
1 − 𝜏h
r − 𝛼 + 𝜆
+ 𝜆






= (𝛽1 − 1)
xR
r − 𝛼 + 𝜆
.
From the previous proof, we acknowledge that the
coefficient of 𝜕xR∕𝜕𝜏h is positive, and the sign of the
right-hand side of the above equation is negative. Thus,
𝜕xR∕𝜕𝜏h > 0.
Proof of Corollary 14. Differentiating Equation 35
with respect to 𝜎, it yields:[
𝜂2(𝛽1 − 𝜂2)b4x
𝜂2−1
R + (𝛽1 − 1)
(
1 − 𝜏h
r − 𝛼 + 𝜆
+ 𝜆






























r − 𝛼 + 𝜆
+ 𝜆





From the previous proofs, we acknowledge that the
coefficient of 𝜕xR∕𝜕𝜎 is positive. As b4 < 0, 𝜂2 < 0 and
𝛽1 > 0, so 𝜕xR∕𝜕𝜆 is positive. We can also show that
𝜕𝛽1∕𝜕𝜎 < 0, 𝜕𝜂2∕𝜕𝜎 > 0, 𝜕b4∕𝜕𝜎 < 0. Therefore,
the sign of the right-hand side of the equation above is
positive, and 𝜕xR∕𝜕𝜎 > 0.
